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Abstract When people interact with socially interactive
robots on a regular basis, it could be that people start devel-
oping some kind of relationship with such robots. People are
able to get attached to several objects in our everyday world.
However, the relationships we build with regular objects
differ significantly from those we may build with socially
interactive robots. In contrast to common nonhuman objects,
socially interactive robots act autonomously, which increases
people’s expectations about its capacities.Moreover, human–
robot interactions are constructed according to the rules of
human–human interaction, inviting users to interact socially
with robots. This paper fosters a discussion on the ethical
considerations of human–robot relationships and discusses
whether these bonds between humans and robots could con-
tribute to the good life. Research on people’s interactions
with and social reactions towards socially interactive robots
is necessary to shape the ethical, societal and legal perspec-
tives on these issues, and facilitates the design of responsible
robotics and the successful introduction of robots into our
society.
Keywords Socially interactive robots · Human–robot
relationships · Robot ethics · Psychological well-being
1 Introduction
The prices of robot manufacture are dropping, which facil-
itate the introduction of service robots into our lives in
unprecedented numbers [66]. However, there is limited
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knowledge about the emotional effects robots could elicit
from their users. Understanding about this topic is an essen-
tial requirement for discussions about the social and ethical
issues regarding what roles we (want to) allow robots to
fulfill in our lives. Research in the area of human–robot
interaction provides evidence that people can establish some
kind of emotional or social bond with socially interactive
robots [33,39,41,72,78]. A socially interactive robot is a
robot that elicits social responses from their human users
because they follow the rules of behavior expected by these
human users [31]. Robots designed for purposes in everyday
environments must operate in spaces specifically designed
for humans. To ease the communication with its users, robots
are designed to evoke social interactions (or just reactions)
following the rules of human social interaction behaviors.
It is commonly assumed that people prefer to interact with
machines in a similar manner they are used to with other
human beings [26]. Ideally, a social robot is capable of com-
municating and interacting in such a sociable way that the
robot allows its users to: (1) understand the robot in human
social terms; (2) relate to the robot; and (3) to empathize
with the robot [14]. Researchers in social robotics aim to
develop such sociable machines by making use of models
and techniques generally used in human–human communi-
cation.
People interact with robotic or computer interfaces in a
similar way they do with other human beings [41,56]. Along
with this human tendency to respond socially to nonhu-
man objects, it has been argued that the fundamental human
motivation of the ‘need to belong’ [8,17] not only induces
ones desire for meaningful and enduring relationships with
other social beings, but also facilitates the likelihood peo-
ple may form emotional attachments to artificial beings [43].
This issue of bonding with nonhuman objects is likely to be
enlarged when these objects possess lifelike abilities and are
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endowedwith humanlike capacities, as is the case for socially
interactive robots.
Relationships with others lie at the very core of human
existence. Humans are conceived within relationships, born
into relationships, and live their lives within relationships
with others [11]. People are not only capable of forming
relationships with other humans, they also have the abil-
ity to engage in social relationships with nonhumans. The
interactions between humans and computer technologies are
increasingly complex and humanlike, increasing the impor-
tance of the role psychological aspects of our relationships
with those technologies take on [13]. In the future, robots
are expected to serve humans in various social environ-
ments, such as the home, eldercare facilities, the workplace,
and schools. In addition to their functional requirements,
robots performing tasks in these social environments also
require socially interactive components [24]. Besides per-
forming their monitoring and assistive tasks, robots in social
environments must engage in social interactions and create
relationships with their users in order to achieve their goals.
For example increasing an elderly person’s health or success-
fully teaching new mathematical insights to scholars.
Currently, human–robot interactions are constructed along
the rules of social behaviors in humanlike interpersonal
interactions, which invites people to have meaningful social
interactions with robots. With a minimal of social cues users
tend to personify these socially interactive robots, which fos-
ters a human willingness to form unidirectional emotional
bonds with these robotic others [61]. Is there something
morally wrong with deceiving humans into thinking they can
foster meaningful interactions with a technological object?
Or is this just a logical next step in our technological world?
Would it be possible for people to become friends with
robots? Are friendships between humans and robots desir-
able?What implications does this have on future generations,
who will be growing up in the everyday presence of robots?
How will this impact the formation of human friendships?
Regardless of the moral or ethical implications of the rela-
tionships between humans and robots, socially interactive
robotswill be entering our everyday lives as soon as their abil-
ities are technically feasible for the application in real world
contexts. This calls for an ethical evaluation of human–robot
relationships. This paper aims to foster a discussion on the
ethical considerations of human–robot relationships and dis-
cusses whether potential bonds between humans and robots
could contribute to the good life. I start the ethical evalu-
ation of human–robot relationships from the philosophical
concepts of the good life, which is connected to the psycho-
logical concept ofwell-being. Consecutively, Iwill argue that
the ethical evaluation of human–robot relationships needs to
consider the roles nonhumans can play in our human social
networks and that robots should be regarded as a new tech-
nological genre. Afterwards follows the ethical evaluation of
human–robot relationships, taking into account that people
perceive and treat robots as social entities. The conclusion of
this paper addresses some societal and ethical consequences
of human–robot relationships, followedby anoutline of some
future directions for their ethical evaluation.
2 Friendship and the Good Life
The good life is a philosophical term for the most desirable
life, often related to Aristotle’s teaching in ethics, and refers
to the physical and psychological well-being of people [15].
Aristotle held that Eudaimonia, often translated as happi-
ness or personal flourishing, is the goal of human thought
and action, and exhibited through the cultivation of human
virtues in accordance with reason [3]. Although traditionally
being a philosophical topic, in recent decades well-being has
become an important concern in psychology [15]. The good
life necessarily entails well-being, which denotes the desir-
able condition of our existence and the end state of our pursuit
[83]. Positive psychology approaches to well-being focus on
finding and nurturing talent and making normal life more
fulfilling [64]. Research in positive psychology aims at devel-
oping positive practices that enhance human well-being, and
focuses on supporting positive experiences, positive indi-
vidual qualities, or positive social processes and institutions
[15]. A Eudaimonia approach to positive psychology, which
recognizes themoral and ethical underpinnings ofwell-being
[83], denotes that happiness consists of objective factors and
therefore correspond to objective list approaches in philoso-
phy [63]. One part of this perfectionist approach to the good
life is the engaged life, which involves, among other aspects,
intimate relations or friendships.
Attachment is an essential part of the expression of virtue
and having friendships forms a structural feature of the good
life [68]. According to Aristotle [3], friendship holds the
reciprocal and mutually acknowledged relation of goodwill
and affection existing between individuals who jointly share
an interest on the basis of virtue, pleasure or utility. The
intrinsic worth of friendships lies in their ability to facilitate
a person’s realization of his or her virtue and the achievement
of happiness. As Sherman [68] explains, ‘to have intimate
friends and family is to have interwoven in one’s life, in
an ubiquitous way, persons toward whom and with whom
one can most fully and continuously express one’s good-
ness’ (p. 594). Postulating that individual happiness can
flourish through friendships implies some notions of the
extended self. People convey and extend their self-concepts
fromobjects surrounding them, includingpersons, places and
objects they feel attached to [9]. Objects bear our connection
to others and help express our sense of self [58]. And in the
case of intimate friendship, people arewilling to givewithout
even having to ask and often without a return expected [3],
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because people perceive this as acting in the interests of this
extended self [68]. The question remains how robots could
fit in to these notions on friendship and the good life? Before
we can adequately address this question, I would first like to
call attention to the concept of technical mediation to frame
the impact of technology on society, and the acknowledge-
ment of robots as a new technological genre, which affects
how we may apply ethics to human–robot relationships.
3 The Impact of Robot Technology on Society
A deterministic approach to technology perceives the role of
technology in society from the concept of technology, which
only allows for risk assessment, i.e., the ethical review of the
normative aspects of the intended use purposes for which the
technology is designed or the quality of the functionalities the
technology represents [75]. The theory of scripts challenges
this purely functional vision of technology by describing how
the various roles technological artifacts play in everyday con-
texts and by illustrating how engineers’ assumptions about
user preferences and competences display themselves in the
technical content of an object [2]. Designers anticipate on
possible use scenarios for the products they are creating and,
implicitly or explicitly, build prescriptions for these use sce-
narios into the materiality of that product [75]. Latour [45]
expands this idea by showing how technologies steer human
behaviors, morally and otherwise. For example, speed bumps
make us slow down, and a door-spring makes us close the
door. Thus, the scripts inherent to technology also help shape
the behaviors of the user.
Following the line of thought fromAkrich andLatour,Ver-
beek [75] demonstrates how our decision making is affected
by technologies in such a way that moral decisions are a
result of an intermediately relation between humans and
technologies. When people start using technologies, these
technologies shape and are shapedby their use context. Social
norms, values and morals are both implicitly and explic-
itly intertwined with technologies, reinforcing or altering our
beliefs and practices. Once a robot has entered a social envi-
ronment, it will alter the distribution of responsibilities and
roleswithin that environment aswell as howpeople act in that
use context or situation [84]. This shift in beliefs and prac-
tices is what Verbeek [76] calls technical mediation: “when
technologies are used, they help to shape the context onwhich
they fulfill their function, they help to shape human actions
and perceptions, and create new practices andways of living”
(p. 92).
The notion of technical mediation is also presented in the
sociological concept of social shaping of technology that,
just like technical mediation, emerged from a long-standing
critique on deterministic views on technology. The social
shaping of technology perspective explaining that there are
choices, both consciously and subconsciously, inextricably
linked to both the design of individual objects and in the
direction or trajectory of innovation programs [82]. Hence,
the meaning of a technology is not restricted to a tech-
nology’s mechanisms, physical and technical properties, or
actual capabilities. This view on technology also extends to
how people believe they will or ought to interact with a tech-
nology, and the way it will or should be incorporated into and
affect their lives. Similarly, the domestication theory denotes
the complexity of everyday life and the role technology plays
within its dynamics, rules, rituals, patterns and routines [69].
By investigating the impact technology has once it becomes
an actor in a social network of humans and nonhumans in
the home, the domestication theory relates to the concept of
technicalmediation. The domestication theory focuses on the
impact a technology has in terms of its meaning in the social
environment, how this meaning is established, and how the
incorporation of the technology in daily routines propagates
or alters existing norms and interpretation of values in the
home.
Together, the above described theories or perspectives on
technology (use) raise critical considerations for the roles
nonhumans play in social interactions. By acknowledging
technologies as more than just functional instruments, but
without being withdrawn in classical images of technolo-
gies as a determining and threatening power, we can start
investigating the impact of technologies in society. The con-
cept of technology is largely defined by the way people
and the societies in which they live in perceive, respond,
and interact to these technologies. Consequently, technolo-
gies also have moral relevance given their role in mediating
one’s beliefs and practices [76]. Therefore, it can be con-
cluded that technology has a socially-embedded meaning
because the shaping process of people’s understanding of a
technology is intertwined with the evolving prevailing social
norms. Recalling the subject of human–robot relationships,
the remaining question is: how will we share our world with
these new social technologies, and how will a future robot
society change who we are, how we act and interact—not
only with robots but also with each other?
4 Applying Ethics to a New Technological Genre
The application of robot ethics is strongly related to the
way robots are perceived. Acknowledging robots strictly
as machines implies that they do not possess any hierar-
chically higher characteristics, nor should they be provided
with consciousness, free will, or a level of autonomy supe-
rior to what is technically embedded by the designer [77].
Yet, people’s interaction experiences with robots fundamen-
tally differ from people’s experiences interacting with most
other technologies due to a strong social or emotional com-
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ponent in human–robot interactions. For instance, people act
upon or talk to some robots as if the robot has sensations
and emotions, even though existing robots are not sentient
and lack feelings. Indeed, people’s social responses to robots
have been reported inmany human–robot interaction studies,
e.g., [6,39,41,47,72]. A lot of robot ethics discussions focus
on the technological abilities of robots, i.e., what is in the
‘mind’ of the robot [8]. It has been argued that the emphasis
of robot ethics should shift to the robot’s outside, i.e., what
robots do to us [20]. Although most people would reason-
ably agree that robots are programmed machines that only
simulate social behavior, the same people seem to ‘forget’
this while interacting with these sociable machines [32].
4.1 Physical Presence and Environmental Awareness
Robots differentiate from the most other technologies in that
they are embodied, autonomous, and mobile technologies
capable of sensing our (social) environments. Although new
media is also advancing the integration of their communi-
cation modes, e.g., with images, sounds, text and data in a
single medium [23], robotic devices hold even richer com-
munication modes since they add nonverbal communication
and higher social presence to their interaction capabilities.
Because robots are embodied, we share our physical worlds
with these socially interactive technologies [14]. Robots can
produce a physical impact on our worlds by holdings hands,
cleaning our home and tripping over objects. Having a phys-
ical body enables robots to perturb and be perturbed by their
environment, which creates a stronger social presence [46,
48], and affects the users’ perceptions and interactions with
robots [14,80,81]. Specifically, socially interactive robots are
different from other technologies because they must be able
to perform their actions in our social environments as well.
And our human world is not easily simplified without the
implementation of potentially unacceptable restrictions for
their users [14]. Robots are able to perceive naturally offered
cues of their users using cameras or microphones. Although
certain other interactivemedia have the same affordance, this
is clearly more limited for a screen character than for a robot
whose sensors can move with it and can remain compelling
eye contact. Due to the strong social and emotional compo-
nent caused by their physical presence in our personal spaces
and their ability to sense our social environments, people’s
interacting experiences with robots appears to be different
from people’s interaction experiences with most other tech-
nologies.
4.2 Social Responses to Robots
With a minimum of social cues, people tend to evaluate
technological objects as social entities. This phenomenon is
known as the media equation [56], which has also been suc-
cessfully applied to the field of social robotics, e.g., [39,41].
People have a tendency to assign a level of intelligence and
sociability to robots which affects the perceptions of those
people of the way interactions should proceed. When robots
are capable of natural language dialog, the users expecta-
tions are not only raised with respect to the natural language,
but also regarding the robot’s intentionality of both verbal
and nonverbal behaviors, its autonomy, and its awareness of
the sociocultural context [70]. Robots embedded with socia-
ble interaction features, such as familiar humanlike gestures
or facial expressions in their designs, are likely to further
encourage people to interact socially with those robots in
a fundamentally unique way. For human users, interaction
with robots is, in a sense, more as if one is interacting with
an animal or another person rather than interacting with a
technology.
Furthermore, the increased autonomy of robot behavior
extends the likelihood that users will regard such robots as
humanlike social entities [42,62]. People tend to associate
a robot’s autonomous behavior with intentionality, which
prompts and reinforces people’s perception of agency in
robots. Agency entails the capacity to act, and transfers the
notion of intentionality [22]. Robots with physically embod-
iments capable of sociable interactions elicit a unique and
affect-charged sense of active agency, which people experi-
ence as similar to that of living entities [86]. This ensures
that human–robot interaction, in a sense, is perceived as if
one is interacting with an animal or another person, and not
as if one is interacting with a technological artifact.
4.3 A New Ontological Category
With robots recognizing our faces, making eye contact, and
responding socially, they are pushing our Darwinian buttons
by displaying behaviors that we associate with sentience,
intentions and emotions [72]. Social robots could be inter-
preted as both animate and inanimate. Animate, because they
move and talk. On the other hand they are inanimate because
they are programmed machines. So it seems like a new onto-
logical category is about to emerge through the creation of
socially interactive robots, and this process magnifies when
robots become increasingly sophisticated in their social abil-
ities [39]. This line of work suggests that socially interactive
robots should be perceived as a new technological genre,
which has been argued by other researchers in social robot-
ics as well [85]. A first evidence for this new technological
genre can be found in the notion that young children cannot
easily distinguish robots from alive or not alive [12,36]. This
despite the fact that children of the same age consistently
group living and nonliving entities as distinct classifications
in terms of biological, psychological and perceptual charac-
teristics from the age of five [35]. So it seems that children
123
Int J of Soc Robotics (2016) 8:589–598 593
do not attribute aliveness to robots in similar ways as they do
with other canonical entities.
4.4 Moral Agency for Robots
Aspecific characteristic of robots points towards an extremely
relevant notion of how everyday life is changing: “robots are
a new form of living glue between our physical world and the
digital universe we have created” (p. XV) [55]. Together with
the statements from the previous paragraphs, this denotes
that we need to perceive robots as an evolution of a new
species. Consequently, this requires us to consider robots to
have autonomy and consciousness, and that robots need to
be created with moral and intellectual features [77]. Cur-
rent robot owners conceptualize their robotic pets in terms
of essence, agency, and social standing, but seldom attribute
moral standing [39]. Thus, although people are willing to
treat a robot as a companion according to these findings, they
are not ready to endow it with human rights. Yet, there is evi-
dence that autonomous robots can be a target formoral blame.
People expect robots to act uponmoral decisions andmore so
blame them for failing to act, whereas this is the exact oppo-
site for humans in a similar situation [52]. Moreover, some
researchers expect that the manifold ways in which we may
treat robots will be similar to how that we treat other humans,
and therefore postulate that ethical behavior towards robots
is merely an extension of such treatment [49]. These argu-
ments obliges us to develop robots that are embedded with
morality and the ability to make sound decisions.
Independent of the discussion of moral agency for robots,
the fact remains that people perceive socially interactive
robots as social entities at a much higher level than justi-
fied by their technological capacities, even by humans who
are fully aware of a robot’s technological limitations. For
social interactions to occur, people only need to assume the
social potential of others [18]. Endowing robots with human
capacities allows us towarrant nonhumans as viable others in
social interactions. Therefore, I postulate that, when dealing
with ethics, we should primarily part from this perception
of robots as social entities when examining and assessing
human–robot relationships.
5 Evaluating Human–Robot Relationships
To begin the ethical evaluation of human–robot relationships,
I embark on a conceptual investigation of the concept of
friendship. Aristotle [3] argues that so called ‘perfect friend-
ship’ is themost worthy form of relationship between people,
which requires that people desire their friend for the sake of
the other and desires the good for the other [5]. This implies
the existence of a relationship betweenmoral equals, inwhich
we acknowledge and enjoy virtue in the other. However, this
notion of ‘perfect friendship’ by Aristotle would only be
appropriate for the discussion of human–robot relationships
if we view these interactive technologies as morally equal.
And the above discussion on morality for robots remained
inconclusive. Therefore, it is suggested to focus on the con-
cept of companionship, which realizes only the social end
of humans [21]. Companionship contains a similar amount
of warmth but is less demanding as it doesn’t acquire moral
symmetry, and it doesn’t entail the need to desire for the
other. Desire for company is sufficient.
The current definition of companionship can be applied
to human relationships with nonhumans, such as robots, and
these relationships can be interpreted as unidirectional emo-
tional bonds initiated from the human user [61]. As stated
earlier, people do not only acknowledge the useful aspects
of robots, but they also experience robots as social entities.
And this challenge traditional ontological categories between
animate and inanimate. Then if people treat robots as more
than lifeless objects, is it then possible to push this argument
into the possibility of moral symmetry? Looking back at the
Aristotelian definition of friendship [3], from a user’s per-
spective, this means that the user only has to perceive that
the robot initiates friendship by showing good will and affec-
tion, and that the robot allows its human user to realize his
or her virtue and achievement of happiness.
Research in human–robot interaction have already shown
that human users establish feelings of reciprocity and mutu-
ality in their interactions with robots [30,33,44], as well as
present findings that human users flourish in the presence
of robots [16,78]. If we accept the Aristotelian definition of
friendship from a user’s perspective, we would ascribe vir-
tual virtue to robots, whatever their designed and intended
functions may be. This enables us to let robots contribute to
the good life of people. People tend to ascribe human virtue
on the bases of consistently good behavior, so this qualifica-
tion would probably be acknowledged to robots with ‘good
habits’ [21]. Thus robots should no longer be perceived as
just machines that follow algorithms, which demands from
the designers to create the illusion of virtue in terms of the
robot’s behavior and motivations. The question is whether
or not this is deception, and whether or not this is morally
wrong?
5.1 Deception and Delusion?
Ethical concerns related to socially interactive robots, espe-
cially those developed for care settings, are increasingly
gaining attention [67,71]. However, a lot of the robotics
research efforts focus on emotional recognition, interpre-
tation and expression [8]. There are already robots that
express emotions through facial expression, but their actual
interaction and communication abilities are still very lim-
ited [25]. The perception of life largely be determined by
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the observation of intelligent behavior, and observed behav-
ior of greater intelligence is granted by people with more
rights [6]. People in general, thus, may succumb to accept-
ing robotic companionshipwithout themoral responsibilities
that real, reciprocal relationships involve [39]. It is there-
fore argued that any benefits gained from interactions with
robots are the consequences of deceiving people into think-
ing they could establish a relationship with robots over
time.
People can feel happy when interacting with robots and
forming relationships with them. However, some argue that
this is a delusion because those people mistakenly believe
that these robots have properties which they do not, and the
failure to apprehend the world accurately is a moral failure
[71]. This concern is shared by Turkle [72] who states that we
need to think about degree of authenticy we acquire from our
technology. Some researchers even claim that already a robot
detecting human social cues and responding with humanlike
cues should be regarded as a form of deception [79]. How-
ever, Coeckelbergh [21] denotes that healthy people, when
interacting with virtual agents in virtual worlds, are aware
of the virtual others while being aware that this other is not
real. People can decide on acting as if something is real even
though they understand it is not [8]. Indeed, people imag-
ine about others all the time, as portrayed in the theory of
mind [34,37,40]. Severson and Carlson [65] advocate that it
is still an open question whether people genuinely perceive
robots as social entities with internal states of mind and per-
ceptual experiences, or whether such ascriptions are merely
a product of imagination. For example, children often play
make-believe or let’s pretend games, they knowingly play
as-if their dolls are alive [19]. Yet Severson and Carlson
acknowledge that this dividing line between ‘as’ and ‘as-
if’ may further fade away when robots become increasingly
more sophisticated and socially interactive. Nonetheless, we
should assume that people can enjoy interacting with a robot
companion without believing they are interacting with a full-
fledged social other.
Although Sparrow and Sparrow [71] rightfully point
to the subconscious processes involved in human–robot
interactions, these subconscious processes also occur in inter-
personal interactions between humans. We can be deceived
about other people and even by other people, which is actu-
ally more malicious because intended deception is morally
worse than unintended deception [21]. As humans, most of
the time we play a certain role to some extend and it is dif-
ficult to distinguish between what appears to be and reality
in human social life. Retrospectively, we consider it to be
acceptable that people mask their own emotions to achieve
ulterior goals [28,38], such as protecting someone else’s feel-
ings and maintaining harmonious relationships or gaining
advantages, avoiding negative consequences and preserving
self-esteem. Thus putting all emphasis on deception when
evaluating human–robot relationships seems misplaced. As
long as the user perceives to be served well by a robot and
is satisfied with the behavior of that robot, there should not
be a problem in this account. Thus the question whether or
not human–robot relationships can contribute to the good
life and enhance well-being, at least for now, needs to be
separated from the discussion on deception. However, one
may argue that these counterfeit emotions and behaviors
could elicit misplaced trust, which is yet another discus-
sion.
6 Conclusion
This paper aimed to foster a discussion on the ethical consid-
erations of human–robot relationships and discusses whether
unidirectional emotional bonds between humans and robots
could contribute to the good life. As shown in the paper,
we can presume that people may establish some relationship
with robotic others [39], and that people could even bene-
fit from these relationships under particular circumstances
[16,78]. Therefore, it seems nothing is intrinsically wrong
with human–robot relationships as long as we can develop
robotic systems that effectively deliver what user’s believe
to be appropriate care behavior [7,21]. Considering socially
interactive robots unethical because their effectiveness relies
on deception just oversimplifies the issue [66]. The currency
of all human social relationships is performance [29], and
rather than it being a bad thing, this is simply how human
social interactions work. People have always been perform-
ing for other people and now the robots too will perform.
When people interact with socially interactive robots, they go
beyond the psychology of projection to that of engagement.
Although we talk to our pets as we do to socially interactive
robots, we do not expect them to respond with a validation of
our ideas and there is no one suggesting that pets are similar
to humans or on their way becoming like us [72]. So, could
a robot really be your friend if it acts like it? As discussed
in this paper, robots cannot be our Aristotelian friends since
they genuinely lack mutuality and reciprocity [21], even if
this is perceived as such by human users. Thus, we need to
ensure that human–robot relationships will not replace their
human counterparts in social relations, as Sparrow and Spar-
row [71] rightfully fear.
Yet, this does not discard the fact that people willingly
initiate different types of relationships with socially inter-
active robots. If people share feelings with robotic others,
theymay become accustomed to the reduced emotional range
that these machines can offer [72]. We know that, especially
young, people will carry over their ways of treating one onto-
logical entity over to another [4], for example from animals
to humans.What will be the impact of human–robot relation-
ships on the relationships we have with other humans? Will
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it change our (moral) standards of friendship and ultimately
lower them? Hence, another concern here is that if we come
to accept these unidirectional emotional bonds with robotic
others,will this degrade our relationshipswith other humans?
There is indeed a concern whether robot technology might
replace human contact all together [67]. For example, the
application of multiple technological systems that provide
eldercare would cease the need for care visits from human
caregivers. This is troublesome not only since many elderly
already feel socially isolated, but also because social isolation
has frequently been associatedwith negative health outcomes
and potential risk factors [54]. Having interactions with sig-
nificant others, not only for the elderly but for all people, give
meaning and guidance to behavior and the development of
the social self.
Social interactions are necessary for normal personality
development and to appropriate social conduct. Social inter-
action produces the social self, which is the part of one own
personality that connects the individual to society, and is con-
sidered an important intervening aspect in human behavior
[53]. The interactions we have with both the humans and
nonhumans surrounding us serve as parts of ourselves [9].
And, as discussed in the paper, both humans and nonhumans
should be considered as actors in a social network of our daily
environment [2,69,76,82].With the increase of digital media
use, the possibilities for self-extension have tremendously
increased, which is fundamentally changing human behav-
ior [10]. For example, when playing video games, avatars
are often seen as an extension of the self, with which we
strongly identify and which is transferred into our online
behavior and sense of self [74]. And indeed, the effects of
the digital age we are living in are already shown in our
decreasing social abilities. Adolescents with higher rates of
internet use indicated to have significantly worse relation-
ships with their mothers and friends [60]. Additionally, there
is evidence that social media and smartphone use makes
us narcissistic, selfish, deceitful, dishonest, compulsive and
vicious [1,73]. In the prospect of the robotic revolution, some
researchers fear the effect frequent close interactions with
robots will damage their emotional and social development
and may ultimate lead to attachment problems [67]. These
concerns are linked to the notion of dehumanization which
happens when rationalization [57] exceeds its mark leading
to the creation of anti-human technological systems [59] and
ultimately the de-socialization of our society when people
start striving for ‘perfect’ relationships [72]. These concerns
emphasize that a future robot society could result not only
in a possible decrease of our social skills but also a reduced
willingness to deal with the complexity of real human rela-
tionships. Ultimately, we need to consider not only how
everyday encounters and social interactions with robots will
change us, but also what implications these changes could
have on our society.
7 Future Directions for the Ethical Evaluation
of Human–Robot Relationships
Despite its relevance, an integrative approach to address the
consequences of innovations lacks attention in the litera-
ture. One reason for this gap might be that the sponsors of
innovative research are often the companies supplying the
innovations who silently assume that their innovations only
result in positive consequences.Another reason for the under-
exposure of the consequences of innovations in general is that
the common researchmethod involves questionnaires, which
are less appropriate to investigate the impact of innovations.
The ideal method for studying the impact of innovations
involves multiple observations over extended periods of
times. A final reason for the research gap comprises the diffi-
culty ofmeasuring consequences. People aremostly unaware
of the possible consequences associatedwith the introduction
of an innovation, resulting in incomplete andmisleading con-
clusions when only the opinions of the general public about
possible consequences are included in a study. Addressing
the potential consequences of human–robot relationships
within our future robot society requires the multidiscipli-
nary insights from the HRI researcher community, as well
as the necessity to design future robots with the inclusion of
understandings from philosophers, legal scholars and policy
makers in the deliberation process.
Robotic technologies are growing faster, increasingly
finding their way into different spheres of everyday life, rang-
ing from the work space to private homes, and from transport
sector to environmental monitoring, crowd controlling and
warfare. The upcoming development of technologies brings
along countless social and ethical issues. One serious soci-
etal consequence of the unidirectional bonds between users
and socially interactive robots is that they provoke psycho-
logical dependencies which are likely to be exploited by the
companies who created these robots [61].Moreover, because
different cultures and religions have different ‘virtues’ and
‘vices’, exhibiting from different worldviews, leading to dif-
ferent results on the same questions [51], it is necessary to
conduct research on ethics and rights for robots in different
cultural settings and contexts.
In the future, when robot will gradually become more like
us and people will increasingly interact with them in an ever
more ‘natural’ social way, the need to address legal, soci-
etal and ethical issues becomes increasingly pressing. Since
humans perceive and treat robots as social actors in our phys-
ical environments, robots should be acknowledged as such
and we should apply robot ethics from that perspective. For
future generations, interactions with robotic others will be
part of every ordinary day. The evermore evaporating line
between online and offline will make it easier for the chil-
dren raised in a future robotics society to socialize with and
through these robotic others. Robotics researchers need to
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heighten the awareness of the relevant legal, societal and eth-
ical issues before robots become ubiquitous in society. The
focus should not only be on preventing ‘bad’ things fromhap-
pening, but there is also the necessity to explore the social
roles robots can (not) or should (not) perform in the future.
When autonomous technologies such as robotswill be used in
everyday environments, researchers need tomapawide range
of possible use scenarios including associated potential con-
sequences for both individual users and society as a whole. If
the dissemination of robots within society replicates that of
personal computers a few decades ago, the rise of important
legal, societal and ethical issues should be expected for our
future robot society as well. Therefore, robotics researchers
need to deal with these issues if we want to anticipate the
potential (negative) consequences of the ubiquitous use of
robots in our society.
Recognizing the notion of technical mediation not only
fosters value-centered design approaches that consciously
incorporate social and cultural meaning into robotic design
but also suggests a need to involve users early in the design
process. Therefore, addressing these legal, societal and ethi-
cal issues cannot be done thoroughly without empirical data
on the relationship between human users and robots. Obser-
vations of real human–robot interactions in people’s natural
environments are necessary to reveal the consequences of
such interactions both on an individual and societal level.
The common presumption is that robots will become ubiq-
uitous in our societies and that it is inevitable that everyone
will be using a social robot in their own homeswithin the not-
so-distant future [27,50]. Research on people’s interactions
with and social reactions towards socially interactive robots
is necessary to shape the ethical, societal and legal perspec-
tives on these issues. By understanding people’s acceptance
of robots and the consequences of potential roles for robots
in society, robotics researchers can more effectively address
their research efforts towards the design of responsible robot-
ics and the successful introduction of robots into our society.
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